Health insurance and game theory
An interesting post by Bhagwad Jal Park at Citizen Economists:
Since insurance companies don’t play fair by testing people and even excluding some people from insurance based on their riskiness, the people who want insurance are perfectly justified in trying to fool the insurance companies by hiding their ailments. It’s a dance, and the outcome all depends on whether the insurance company can discover the hidden ailments of the person or not.
There is no stable solution to this. In other words, no Nash equilibrium exists. One of the parties will always wish that they had – or didn’t have – insurance, or the insurance company will always wish that they had – or didn’t have – a certain person’s business. A zero sum game. In the end, both parties can be happy only if they assess the situation differently. That is, each thinks that they have outwitted the other.
This sounds like another argument for market-based health care where patients pay doctors (or non-physician practitioners) directly without intervening third parties.